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Résumé / Abstract 
 
Les mécanismes d'incitation utilisés dans l'industrie des services financiers en particulier, mais 
aussi  dans  de  nombreux  autres  contextes,  reconnaissent  les  revenus  générés  presque 
indépendamment  des  risques,  menant  à  la  négligence  des  risques  et  donc  à  une  prise 
injustifiée  risques.  Plusieurs  économistes  ont  mis  en  garde  les  entreprises  financières, 
industrielles et de services contre ces pratiques, leur rappelant l’importance de bien considérer 
la prise de risque pour éviter ce que les économistes et les assureurs appellent « l'aléa moral ». 
Je passe en revue la rémunération incitative basée sur les premiers principes de l'économie des 
organisations. De toute évidence, dans de nombreux cas, ces principes n'ont pas été suivis, ce 
qui a conduit à une crise de gouvernance, une crise financière et une crise économique. 
 
Mots clés : mécanismes d’incitation, risque, rémunération incitative. 
 
 
The incentive mechanisms used in the financial services industry in particular, but also in 
many other contexts, reward income generated almost regardless of risk, with negligent and 
faulty  risk  measurement  and  unjustified  risk  taking  as  predictable  results.  A  number  of 
economists  warned  financial,  industrial  and  service  corporations  against  these  practices, 
reminding them that, in designing incentive mechanisms, it is necessary to take account of the 
risks taken or incurred to avoid what economists and insurers call “moral hazard.” I review 
incentive pay based on first principles of the economics of organization. Clearly, in many 
cases, those principles were not followed, which led to a governance crisis, a financial crisis 
and an economic crisis. 
 
Keywords: Incentive mechanisms, risk, incentive pay. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In general, incentive pay is not desirable.  
 
It is not desirable for two main reasons. First, it puts the worker or employee at risk of 
fluctuations in his/her wages, salaries, and other benefits. Given that human beings are 
known to prefer certainty outcomes over risky ones, the risk level faced by the individual 
will need to be properly or competitively compensated, in such a way that the expected 
compensation (probability-weighted mean compensation) will increase with the level of 
risk so supported. Second, an incentive compensation system is costly to run. It is not 
easy  to  properly  calibrate  the  intensity  of  incentives  a  compensation  system  should 
implement, as the twelve principles discussed in this paper will suggest. Moreover, a 
fluctuating compensation may generate resentment if and when compensation falls below 
the mean level, a situation which is likely to occur about no less than half of the time. 
 
There are different reasons to revisit hic et nunc the topic of incentive pay. First, there is 
strong criticism of actual systems in the context of the recent economic recession, which 
allegedly stemmed in part from exaggerations in the mortgage market in the US as well 
as, for many observers and commentators, from the structure of incentive pay systems in 
place in the financial sector. Second, we see in these troubled times movements away for 
incentive or variable pay in some sectors but toward such systems in most other sectors. 
Third, there are clear misunderstandings of the basic issues related to the role and nature 
of incentive pay in general.   
 
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, large brokerage firms and investment banks 
paid out record bonuses to their managers, the very people who had put them in serious 
trouble. According to New York state's comptroller's office, Wall Street firms paid $33.2 
billion in bonuses in 2007,  about the same amount as in 2006, while the shareholder 
value of the seven biggest firms fell by more than $200 billion. For example: Lehman 
Brothers raised its  bonuses  by 10% in  2007, bringing them to $5.7 billion, and was   2 
bankrupt  in  September  2008.  What  if  these  bonuses  were  among  the  causes  of  the 
financial  crisis?  The  incentive  mechanisms  used  in  the  financial  services  industry  in 
particular reward income generated almost regardless of risk, with negligent and faulty 
risk  measurement  and  unjustified  risk  taking  as  predictable  results.  A  number  of 
economists warned financial, industrial and service corporations against these practices, 
reminding them that, in designing incentive mechanisms, it is necessary to take account 
of the risks taken or incurred to avoid what economists and insurers call “moral hazard.”  
 
Economists specializing in performance incentives have been suggesting for a number of 
years that bonuses be made conditional on risk audits to penalize, rather than reward, 
exceptional  financial  results  relying  on  reckless  risk-taking.
1  These suggestions have 
been mostly ignored with disastrous effects. But there seems to be light at the end of the 
tunnel. In the rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie  Mac, the managers, shareholders and 
bondholders of these government-sponsored enterprises, which were overly dominant in 
mortgage credit and were protected by indulgent regulators, have taken a  beating. The 
government will be paid back first. And these companies can no longer benefit from their 
political relationships to hide mismanagement: the door is closing! While the horse may 
be gone, at least the colt will be kept in the stable.  
 
According to one analyst, banks have replaced   their  traditional  “originate  and  hold” 
model with a new “originate and transfer” model under which they lend and then sell the 
debt to someone else.
2 The more widespread adoption of this new model may be a factor 
responsible for the crisis. However, the phenomenon of securitization is not new: banks 
have been following this practice for nearly 30 years without causing crises. What has 
changed in the last decade  was the significant growth in securities backed by subprime 
mortgages which were traded (transferred) so fast and so often that a major problem of 
transparency ends up arising. This practice led to the creation of a class of capital around 
which it becomes enormously difficult to establish who is assuming fundamental risks.  
                                                 
1 See Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, “How to restore higher-powered incentives in multitask agencies,” 
Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 15, Issue 2 (July 1999), pp. 418-433. 
2 Paul Mizen, “The Credit Crunch of 2007-2008: A Discussion of the Background, Market Reactions, and 
Policy Responses,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, September/October 2008, pp. 531-568.   3 
 
This particularity has distorted incentives in many different ways. Mortgage brokers‟ fees 
were based solely on the number of mortgage loans provided, without the risk of default 
taken into consideration. Brokers thus had no incentive at all to look into the risks linked 
to subprime mortgage loans. On the contrary, they had incentives to provide the greater 
possible number of mortgage loans regardless of the risk level they presented. Lenders 
had no incentive to check the quality of the mortgage loans granted, given that they 
intended to bundle and resell these assets in the form of complex derivatives. In the years 
before the  crisis  broke  out,  these institutions increased their subprime  mortgage loan 
offerings,  reselling  them  to  investors  looking  for  higher  (but  riskier)  returns.  Banks, 
investment banks and other financial institutions were quick to rely on choices made by 
their competitors or partners while assuming that those competitors and partners must 
have checked the risk quality and characteristics of such securities, hence dispensed of 
making “redundant” costly verifications, a well known free riding problem. In the end, a 
global web of individually rational actions and policies based on others‟ individually 
rational  actions  and  policies,  each  other  ones  relying  on  each  other  ones,  ended  up 
creating a huge systemic risk which by definition cannot always be avoided: eventually, 
the chips must fall!      
 
Incentive  pay  may  be  explained  and  justified  by  and  in  reference  to  four  factors  or 
phenomena, which may have important effects on the net benefits of an organization and 
which are often although not always present in practice:  
  moral hazard, defined as the tendency of individuals to alter their safety, effort or 
initiative behaviour, as private information becomes available to them, if they are 
protected or insured against the losses otherwise incurred following unfavourable 
events  or  unable  to  capture  part  of  the  benefits  generated  by  such  behaviour, 
thereby  increasing  the  probability  of  unfavourable  events  and/or  reducing  the 
probability of favourable ones;  
  adverse selection, defined as the tendency of individuals to use strategically their 
private information to pursue objectives that are non congruent with those of the 
organization, including accepting jobs and responsibilities for which they may not   4 
be sufficiently competent or productive, a characteristic better known to them that 
to the organization hiring them;  
  the  need  to  induce  profitable  cooperation  in  organizations,  broadly  defined  to 
include team work as well as contractual relations between business partners and 
between stakeholders;  
  the  need  to  counteract  costly  or  unproductive  institutional  and/or  regulatory 
constraints.     
 
The first two factors/phenomena represent the traditional bases for incentive pay. There is 
moral hazard when the effort exerted by an agent to raise the probability of  success, the 
quality, the productivity, or the profitability of some projects cannot be observed by other 
parties or stakeholders, and is, therefore, private information of the agent. This 
information can be used strategically either to reduce costly effort levels or to redirect 
such effort towards other objectives. A firm or a collection of citizens for whom the 
production or distribution of private goods and services or public and social goods and 
services is intended and done, or their representatives, may not be able to observe the 
effort levels exerted by the providers of those goods and services to make this provision 
as close as possible to its expected quality, quality/cost ratio, and other characteristics.  
 
There is adverse selection each time an agent can benefit and abuse of an informational 
advantage on some relevant characteristics. This asymmetry of information reduces the 
efficiency of contracting since both parties are not in full knowledge of the relevant facts. 
Adverse selection is a pre-contractual problem of opportunism, while moral hazard is a 
post-contractual  problem  of  opportunism.  Other  similar  problems  of  asymmetric 
information leading to some opportunism by one or both parties to a contract exist, such 
as free-riding behaviour and hold-up behaviour. Efficient contracting in the production or 
distribution of private goods and services or public and social goods and services must 
include incentive-compatible clauses that are intended to optimally reduce the impact of 
such potential sources of inefficiency.  
   5 
Moral hazard and adverse selection may come in different forms and shapes, in static and 
dynamic contexts. Boyer and Robert (2006)
3 for instance develop a model to explain the 
level of inertia as an endogenou s rational choice made by the organization (principal). 
They  show  that  the  efficient  organizational  response  to  the  presence  of  private 
information on the value of change will in general be to bias the decision rule towards the 
status quo, that the compensation of the agent differs significantly according to whether 
the information is private to the principal or the agent, and  that the efficient distribution 
of  „real‟  authority  in  an  organization  need  not  always  be  profitably  retained  by  the 
principal. 
 
The third may or may not have an incentive basis: it does [not] if the worker or service 
provider can [cannot] make decisions capable of mitigating the risk present in the relation 
between  the  worker/provider  and  the  employer/client.  More  generally,  the  design  of 
incentive pay, price, and contract systems in value chains and value networks represents 
major  challenges  for  firms  and  organizations  in  complex  production  and  delivery 
systems.  Outsourcing,  offshoring  and  public-private  partnerships  are  examples  of 
complex production and delivery systems, where risks and asymmetric information are 
significant  characteristics.  Although  important,  these  concerns  address  inter  firm 
relationships and we will not pursue their analysis here.
4 
 
The fourth reason is of a diff erent nature. Even if there is no moral hazard, no adverse 
selection, and no need or willingness to share risks, a firm may find it profitable to 
implement an incentive compensation system if regulatory constraints prevent it from 
disciplining the worker or manager who fails to meet expectations, the required output, or 
                                                 
3 Boyer, M. and J. Robert, “Organizational Inertia and Dynamic Incentives”, Journal of Economic Behavior 
and Organization 59(3), March 2006, 324-348. See also in the same vein Holmström, B., “On teh Theory 
of Delegation,” chapter 8 in M. Boyer and R.E. Kihlstrom (eds.), Bayesian Models in Economic Theory, 
Studies in Bayesian Econometrics, North-Holland Elsevier Science Pub., 2004.  
4 See Boyer, M., “The Design of an Efficient Offshoring Strategy: Some Reflections with Links to SNC-
Lavalin.” Chapter 7 in Proceedings of the conference "Offshoring Outsourcing: Capitalizing on Lessons 
Learned," (October 2006), edited by Daniel Trefler.  Conference sponsored by Industry Canada and the 
Rotman  School  of  Management. Available  from:  http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/offshoring/,  2009,  50 
pages.   6 
the labour agreement in general. In such case, incentive pay makes misbehaviour costly 
for the protected worker/manager himself, hence contributes to reducing misbehaviour.  
 
Incentive pay systems should be distinguished from risk sharing contracts. Even if the 
worker/provider cannot influence the probability of different states or the results in those 
different  states,  a  risk  sharing  agreement  may  be  of  interest  as  it  makes  the 
worker/provider  and  the  employer/client  partners  (although  with  different  levels  of 
responsibility and control) in the relevant business. Hence variable pay may be designed 
as a risk sharing agreement. But a variable pay system need not be an incentive pay 
system.
5    
 
The above suggests that, unless there is a  major observation or information problem or 
significant  institutional  or  regulatory  constraints ,  there  is  no  case  for  incentive 
compensation. The above suggests also that there are dangers for  an organization not to 
have an incentive pay system. Indeed, the compensation formula(s) in any organization is 
a  fundamental  management  tool  to  achieve  coordination  between  the  efforts  and 
decisions of different individuals and divisions towards achieving the highest possib le 
level of performance, measured with respect to the overall objectives and mission of the 
organization. The failure to realize the importance of this tool could jeopardize the 
organization‟s capability to fulfill its mission, as incentive pay is the most efficient way 
to make the key members of the organization liable or responsible for their own relative 
contributions to the success or lack of success of the organization. In so doing, it could 
protect  the  organization  against  failing  employees  as  well  as  protect  successful 
employees against being held up by their employer organization. Finally, putting in place 
an incentive compensation system forces the organization to explicitly and concretely 
state its mission and objectives. 
 
                                                 
5 Risk sharing agreements are quite common for instance in intellectual property compensation contracts as 
well as in patent pooling agreements. See Boyer, M., “The Canadian Copyright Board: Economic Concepts 
and Principles in Decisions and Arguments”, Proceedings of the ALAI Conference (Ottawa 2009-12-02) 
« Copyright  Board  of  Canada:  Bridging  Law  and  Economics  for  20  years »,  Montréal,  Editions 
Carswell/Yvon Blais, 2011 (forthcoming).  
   7 
Incentive pay should be understood as compensation schemes which create congruence 
within  an  organization:  incentive  pay  can  contribute  to  ensuring  that  the  pursuit  of 
individual  objectives  or  interests  is  canalized  towards  the  achievement  of  the 
organization‟s goals and objectives.  
 
The currently designed compensation formulas may not be the best or optimal ones to 
achieve  the  goals  set  for  the  organization:  hence  the  current  twelve  main  or  basic 
principles. It is important that the formula be transparent, explicit, and optimally designed 
given  the  characteristics  of  the  job  to  be  done  and  the  mission  or  objectives  of  the 
organization.  Many  incentive  pay  systems  remain  opaque  and  poorly  designed,  a 
phenomenon  which  contributes  to  the  ill-famed  use  of  variable  compensation  in 
numerous organizations.  
 
2.  THE PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMICS OF INCENTIVE PAY  
 
Why and when are incentive pay systems necessary or desirable? The answer to this 
question relies on three main phenomenal pillars: the typical individual preference of 
certainty over risk goes against incentive pay  and therefore, an incentive pay system 
should  be  justified  by  strong  reasons  showing  the  necessity  and  profitability  of 
implementing such a system; the individuals‟ characteristics and effort, which are linked 
to  the  organization‟s  performance,  may  be  difficult  to  observe  in  many  contexts, 
preventing contracts to be written on the basis of such characteristics and effort; the links 
in question involve the (imperfectly observed and evaluated) impacts of the employees‟ 
or  stakeholders‟  (unobserved)  real  decisions  and/or  actions  on  the  organization‟s 
performance. 
 
What  do  we  need  to  study  such  a  question?  First,  a  behaviour  model,  that  is  a 
formalization of individual behaviour amenable to useful sensitivity analysis in order to 
derive some general principles to follow in setting up and managing an incentive pay 
system. We will use here a first principles economic model: an individual‟s behaviour 
can  be  explained  and  predicted  from  two  sets  of  variables,  namely  preferences  and   8 
incentives. In this model, preferences are a relatively stable long run phenomenon, either 
deeply  rooted  in  innate  behavioural  characteristics  or  determined  through  long  term 
personality-defining  socialization,  while  incentives  can  be  modified  to  curb  the 
individual‟s behaviour. Both preferences and incentives may change but on different time 
scales: for incentive pay consideration, only the first set of variables is considered to be 
constant  or  fixed  and  therefore  changes  in  behaviour  can  only  be  obtained  through 
changes in the second set of variables.  
 
Second, we need a formal representation of an organization, possibly simplified to its 
bare bone skeleton. Again, we will use a first principles representation of an organization: 
one  principal  and  one  agent  whose  interactions  determine  the  organization‟s 
performance.  The  head  or  “principal”  (manager,  supervisor,  chairperson)  of  the 
organization, assumed to be risk-neutral, wants to maximize the expected surplus of the 
organization over the different “states of the world”, which are the different situations or 
contexts in which the organization and its members may find themselves. The principal 
asks the agent (manager, worker, team, division) to perform tasks that are of interest for 
the organization. A surplus is generated for the benefit of the principal and the agent. 
Third, we need to identify explicitly the set of constraints that an incentive pay system 
must satisfy: informational constraints, behavioural constraints, and legal constraints such 
as those imposed by limited liability, contract law, tort law, vicarious liability, etc.
6 
 
Let us be a bit more precise.  In each given state  i occurring with probability i p , the 
surplus is by assumption equal to the total value  i   of the organization minus the agent‟s 
compensation,  which  may  depend  on  the  realized  state,  that  is,  based  on  the 
organization‟s overall performance  () ii WW  : 
  max [ ( )] ( ) i i i
i
E W p W         (1) 
                                                 
6 There is an abundant literature in economics on those topics. Two seminal works can be mentioned here: 
Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, Economics, Organizations and Management, Prentice-Hall, 1992; Jean-
Jacques Laffont and David Martimort, The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model, Princeton 
University Press, 2001.   9 
The agent or individual, assumed to be risk-averse, wants to maximize his own well 
being equal to the expected value of his “utility” or satisfaction, which is a function of his 
remuneration  () i UW , increasing with  i W  but at a decreasing rate ( 0,  0) UU    : 
   max [ ( ( )] ( ) i i i i
i
E U W pU W     (2) 
Let us assume first that there is imperfect but complete information , that is, the state of 
the world is unknown at the time the decisions are made but both  the principal and the 
agent have  the  same  knowledg e,  that  is,  in  particular, both  the  characteristics  and  the 
efforts of the agent are observed by both . The optimal remuneration scheme is the one 
which  maximize s  the  expected   or  probability -weighted  average   surplus  of  the 
organization  subject  to  the  constr aint  that the  agent  (or sufficiently  many  individuals) 
accepts to participate, that is, accepts the organization‟s conditions of employment.  The 
optimal remuneration scheme solves: 
 
0
max [ ] ( )





E W p W
pU W U




  (3) 
 
3.  THE TWELVE PRINCIPLES OF INCENTIVE PAY  
 
Let us form the Lagrangian L or problem (3): 
  0 ( ) ( ( ) ) i i i i i
ii
L p W pU W U          (4) 
Necessary conditions for a maximum of L are that for each state i :  






     







    (6) 
which implies that  i W  is constant across different states i. Hence:  
 
#1 – THE PRINCIPLE OF INSURANCE   10 
Given that the individual is risk averse, it is efficient for the organization 
to set up, under imperfect but complete information, a state-independent 
compensation scheme [no incentive pay]. 
 
Suppose, without loss of generality, that there are two possible states of the world, state 1 
and state 2 with performance levels  1   and  2   respectively with  12   ; suppose that 
if the individual‟s effort is high, the probability of state 2, the high performance state, is 
x and if effort is low, that probability is  y  with x  y. Moreover, let us suppose that the 
individual‟s effort is costly to him and that the cost in money terms of the high level of 
effort is   while the cost of the low level of effort is 0. Let us suppose that if she could 
observe the level of effort, the head of the organization would prefer a high level of effort 
from the individual at a cost of  0 W    to a low level of effort at a cost of  0 W , that is: 
  2 1 0 2 1 0 (1 ) ( ) (1 ) . x x W y y W                (7) 
If the level of effort is (perfectly) observed by the head of the organization, then she 
would simply compensate appropriately the individual for the effort she asks for but still 
apply the principle of insurance: remuneration is independent of the state i: 
  1 2 0 W W W       (8) 
But if effort is an important driver of performance and if the individual‟s effort is not 
observable by the principal, the individual must be made  responsible enough  for the 
performance of the organization to induce him to exert the proper level of effort. To 
achieve that, a link must be created between the level of remuneration of the agent and 
the level of performance of the organization, thereby submitting the individual to some 
level of risk (uncertain pay) and relaxing the principle of insurance. This moral hazard 
situation may call for the individual to become subject to some exposure to risk in his 
remuneration.  
 
Without an incentive pay system, the individual is facing the following choice: provide at 
a cost of   the high level of effort, which in any case will not be observed, or provide the 
minimal level 0, but in both cases get the same remuneration, that is, compare 
  ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) x E U W xU W x U W U W             (9) 
  11 
with 
  ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) y E U W yU W y U W U W       (10) 
Clearly, since  ( ) ( ) U W U W   , the individual chooses the second alternative with the 
minimal level of effort. 
 
#2 – THE PRINCIPLE OF RATIONALITY  
When the effort is not observable and the compensation is independent of 
the realized state of the world, that is, independent of the organization’s 
performance, the individual will provide a suboptimal level of effort (the 
individual cost-minimizing level of effort). 
 
To induce a high level of effort from the individual, the principal must set up an incentive 
remuneration scheme so that the individual will find it in his best interest to provide the 
high effort level that she wants him to provide. Two constraints must then be met by the 
remuneration  scheme:  a  participation  constraint  (the  organization  must  convince  the 
individual  to  enter  and  participate  in  the  organization,  given  his  best  alternative 
employment opportunity represented by  0 U ), that is, under he high level of effort, 
  2 1 0 ( ) (1 ) ( ) xU W x U W U       ,  (11) 
and an incentive compatibility constraint (the individual must choose voluntarily, since 
effort is not observed anyway, the high level of effort), that is: 
  2 1 2 1 ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) xU W x U W yU W y U W         .  (12) 
Clearly, as x  y, we need  21 WW  and therefore the principle of insurance is relaxed.  
 
The  head  of  the  organization  will  choose  the  remuneration  scheme  12 ( , ) WW   which 
maximizes the expected performance of the organization net of the labour costs, subject 
to the participation constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint, that is, she will 
solve the following optimization problem: 
  12
2 2 1 1 , max  ( ) (1 )( )
subject to (11) and (12).
WW x W x W      
  (13)   12 
Clearly,  the  head  has  no  interest  in  paying  more  than  necessary  and  so,  the  two 
constraints (11) and (12) will be satisfied with a strict equality in an efficient incentive 
pay system. 
 
Given that the individual is risk averse ( ( ) 0 UW   ), the expected level of remuneration 
net of effort will be higher under an incentive pay system than under a constant pay 
system, that is 
  2 1 0 ( ) (1 )( ) x W x W W       .  (14) 
The fact that he is exposed to a level of risk (uncertainty in his remuneration) under the 
incentive pay system requires that he be compensated for that risk so that his expected 
compensation is larger than his best alternative ( 0 W ), while properly compensating him 
for the level of effort ( ) he will be asked and induced to provide. 
 
Let us now consider that the level of effort is a continuous variable e ≥ 0 and that the cost 
of effort in monetary equivalent terms is C(e). In the analysis above, the only variable the 
principal could observe was the level of performance of the organization. To make the 
analysis more realistic, let us assume that although effort is not observed as such, the 
head can observe two proxies, that is, two indicators: one directly related to effort, say 
ze ,  with     being  a  random  variable  representing  all  factors that  blur  the 
observation of effort e, and another indicator   imperfectly related to   but not directly 
related to e.  
 
This  is  typical  of  many  applied  cases:  not  only  do  we  have  an  evaluation  of  the 
organization‟s  performance  but  we  also  have  different  imperfect  observations  of  the 
individual‟s effort: an imperfect observation of effort through a variable z, directly related 
to effort but blurred by random factors represented by  , and an imperfect observation of 
type  , representing observables related to those random factors, that is affecting the 
quality or reliability of the observation of effort e through variable z. Indicator variable  z  
may  be  either  the  performance  of  the  organization  itself  (or  depend  in  part  on  the 
performance  of  the  organization),  or  comments  of  better  informed  colleagues  on  the 

  13 
individual‟s  level  of  effort;  or  sales  record;  or  satisfaction  of  surveyed  clients;  or  a 
combination of the above. Indicator variable   may be thought of as being related to the 
particular “conditions of realization” of an individual‟s task such as the general economic 
conditions,  the  industry  performance  average  (benchmark),  the  recent  introduction  of 
substitute products, etc.  
 
Indicator variable  z  can be seen as providing information of the first order or directly 
related to effort while indicator variable   can be seen as providing information of the 
second order or indirectly related to effort through making the relationship between effort 
and  variable  z   more  precise  or  reliable.  Rather  than  relating  the  individual‟s 
compensation to the sole performance  of the organization, the head can relate it to the 
observed indicator variables z and  , which are by assumption more informative of the 
level of effort exerted by the individual.  Suppose that she uses the following relatively 
general linear formula: 
  ( ) ( ) W z e                 (15) 
where   is the weight carried by the indicator variable   in the compensation formula, 
the weight of indicator variable z being normalized to 1.  
 
The compensation formula is now composed of two parts: the first part, represented by 
the parameter  , is the portion which is independent of the observed indicator proxies z 
and  v  and  therefore  independent  of  (unobservable)  effort  level  e;  the  second  part, 
represented by the expression  () e     , is the portion indirectly dependent on effort 
through the effect of e on the value of the random proxy z, given the proxy  , which 
serves to make the observation of z more valuable, that is, more revealing of the probable 
value of e.  
 
The parameter    represents a measure of the “intensity of incentives” since it is the 
slope of the effort factor. It measures the importance of effort in determining the total 
compensation. The individual is facing a risk in his compensation since it will depend not 







  14 
We  can  define  a  certainty  equivalent  compensation  CEW  in  such  a  way  that  the 
individual would be indifferent, given the level of effort he is providing, between that 
fixed assured compensation level CEW and the random compensation level affected by   
and  . The certainty equivalent compensation is measured by the expected compensation 
EW provided by the incentive compensation formula minus the cost to the individual of 
providing the chosen level of effort C(e) and minus a risk premium R equal to what the 
individual  would  be  ready  to  pay  to  avoid  that  risk  in  his  compensation.  The  risk 
premium  is  to  a  first  approximation  proportional  to  the  risk  level  measured  by  the 
variance of the compensation Var(W), for a given level of effort, and to the level of risk 
aversion r of the individual. More precisely, we have 
  1
2 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) CEW EW C e R e C e rVar W                (16) 
with  
 
2 2 2 ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ) 2 ( , )) Var W Var Var Var COV                .  (17) 
We obtain the following principle: 
 
# 3 – THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTAINTY EQUIVALENCE  
The  individual  is  indifferent  between  facing  a  risky  compensation 
perspective  and  its  certainty  equivalent  value  equal  to  the  expected 
compensation  (net  of  the  cost  of  effort)  minus  a  risk  premium,  which 
compensates the individual for the risk he faces. 
 
Given that the individual is facing the compensation formula (15) and given that effort 
represents  a  personal  cost  () Ce,  he  will  choose  to  provide  the  level  of  effort  which 
maximizes his expected utility. This is equivalent to maximizing the CEW since that is 
the level of compensation which if obtained with certainty is equivalent in terms of utility 
to the risky compensation formula. Hence, the level of effort chosen by the individual 
may be characterized as maximizing CEW and therefore is characterized by  
  ( ) 0 Ce    .  (18) 
This  expression  is  indeed  an  incentive  compatibility  constraint:  if  the  head  of  the  
organization wants to induce the level of effort  e , then she must set    equal to  () Ce  , 
that is, equal to the individual‟s marginal cost of providing effort evaluated at  . ee   The 
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larger  , the larger   and the larger the individual‟s compensation. The value of   is 
then set to satisfy the participation constraint  0 () CEW e W  . 
 
A compensation scheme may therefore be characterized by the triplet  ( , , )    . To any 




2 ( ) ( ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ) 2 ( , )) E e e C e r Var Var COV                     .   
The  head  of  the  organization will  choose  ( ,  ,  ,  ) e      to  maximize  this  measure  of 
profitability subject to the constraint  () Ce    , the value of   being set residually so 
that  . The chosen (profitability maximizing) value of  , that is, the weight 

























  (20) 










   (21) 
We obtain the following principle: 
 
# 4 – THE PRINCIPLE OF DUAL PERFORMANCE MEASURES  
The relative weight assigned to the information of the second order in the 
evaluation process [the weight of the information of the first order being 
normalized to 1] is equal to the negative of its relative informativeness, 
measured by the ratio of its covariance with the random factors that blur 
the reliability of the information of the first order and its own variance.  
 
e 
( , , )   
0 () CEW e W   16 
If  ( , ) [ ] 0 COV   , then   is negative [positive], the more so the larger  ( , ) COV   is 
in absolute value. The larger the variance  () Var  , the less informative   is and the 
closer   is to zero.  
 
Substituting back into the risk premium, we obtain 
2 2 2 1 1 1
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   . 
 
# 5 – THE PRINCIPLE OF THE RISK PREMIUM  
The  risk  premium  the  firm  must  pay  to  the  individual  when  it 
implements an incentive (risky) pay system is  
  increasing  with  the  individual’s  risk  aversion,  the  intensity  of 
incentives, the imprecision of the information of the first order; 
  decreasing with the absolute value of the informativeness of the 
information of the second order. 
  
The  characterization  of  the  profit  maximizing  value  of  e  can  be  achieved  by  first 
replacing    by  '( ) Ce and using  *   from (21) in the measure of profitability and then 
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         (22) 
a  characterization  of  the  efficient  level  of  effort  to  be  induced  from  the  individual 
(assuming without loss of generality that  0  ): 
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           (23) 
leading to the condition  
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,  (24) 

*   17 
which defines the profitability maximizing level of effort  * e  to be induced from the 
agent.  For  example,  assuming  that 
2 () C e ce  ,  we  have  '( ) 2 C e ce    and  ''( ) 2 C e c  . 

















.    (25) 
From (18), we then get 
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   
,   (26) 
that is, as expected,  * 2 * e   . As for the value of  , it is determined residually to satisfy 
the participation constraint.
7 We obtain the following principles: 
 
# 6 – THE PRINCIPLE OF INTENSITY OF INCENTIVES  
From (26), the intensity of incentives is  
  increasing with the expected impact of the individual’s effort on 
the performance of the organization, with the coefficient of risk 
aversion, and with the imprecision of the information of the first 
order  (the evaluation measure) 
  decreasing with the absolute value of the informativeness of the 
information of the second order 
 
# 7 – THE PRINCIPLE OF OPTIMIZED PERFORMANCE  
An  organization’s  performance  will  be  lower,  the  level  of  effort 
demanded  will  be  lower,  and  the  intensity  of  incentives  will  be  lower 
when the degree of risk aversion of its typical members is larger, the 
difficulty of monitoring or observing effort is higher, and the marginal 
cost of effort increases faster. 
 
                                                 
7 Under full information, assuming 
2 () C e e  , we would have  1
2 * ( *) i e E e   .   18 
The last two principles  suggest that if the individual‟s effort is subject  to decreasing 
returns, that is  ( ) 0 i e   , then the efficient level of effort demanded from the individual 
will be lower, the more risk averse the individuals are, the more difficult the observation 
of effort is (measured by the variance  () Var    ), and the faster the marginal cost of 
effort is increasing.  
 
In  other  words,  an  organization‟s  performance  will  increase  if  the  organization  hires 
individuals who are less risk averse and whose disutility of effort (aversion to effort) 
increase rather slowly with effort (individuals who are more efficient or more tolerant to 
effort).  
 
The  organization‟s  performance  will  also  increase  with  the  quality  of  the  evaluation 
process. It is reasonable to suppose that the observations of z and   are subject to some 
error-in-variable  phenomena.  It  will  in  general  be  possible  to  get  a  better  quality  of 
observation by spending more resources on evaluation. To determine the factors behind 
the determination of the efficient level of the budget earmarked to the evaluation task, let 
us suppose that the variance  () Var e     is a decreasing function of the budget M 
spent on evaluation (or the size of the random sample of observation units). One can 
assume that the evaluation process is valuable (it reduces the variance) but subject to 
decreasing  returns  (the  reduction  is  less  and  less  important  as  the  evaluation  budget 


















.  We  can  characterize  the 
efficient budget as the budget that maximizes the profitability of the firm given by (22), 
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# 8- THE PRINCIPLE OF EFFICIENCY IN THE EVALUATION BUDGET  
The efficient budget level to be spent on evaluation (monitoring) is such 
that  the  marginal  impact  of  an  increase  in  the  budget  in  reducing  the 
variance of the evaluation error is inversely proportional to the individual’s 
degree of risk aversion and the square of the intensity of incentives.   
 
This principle suggests that the smaller the degree of risk aversion is, and the weaker the 
intensity of incentives is, then the larger the evaluation budget should be (because the 
more  efficient  it  is)  and  conversely,  the  larger  the  risk  aversion  and  the  higher  the 
intensity of incentives, the less the firm should spend on evaluation. From principles #6, 
#7 and #8, we obtain: 
 
# 9- THE PRINCIPLE OF INFORMATIVENESS  
Incentive compensation formulas perform better (are less costly) when they 
are  based  on  performance  measures  that  are  affected  more  by  the 
individual’s chosen level of effort and less by random factors.  
 
It is quite frequent that an individual in an organization will be asked to perform more 
than one task, each requiring some effort or attention from the individual. Suppose that 
the individual is asked to perform two tasks with effort levels  1 e  and  2 e , each being 
evaluated through specific indicator variables. Then the CEW and the variance of the 
compensation are given by: 
  1
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) CEW e e C e e rVar W                    (29) 
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Hence, 
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# 10- THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL COMPENSATION INTENSITY  
If the allocation of time or effort between two different activities cannot be 
monitored by the head of the organisation, then she must set the intensities 
of  incentives  at  the  same  level;  otherwise,  the  activity  with  the  lower 
marginal  rate  of  return  to  the  individual  receives  too  little  time  or 
attention. 
 
The above principles imply the following two principles:  
 
# 11- THE PRINCIPLE OF DEFERRED COMPENSATION 
If the impact of one’s effort is expected to occur in a later period or to last 
many periods, the incentive pay system and the incentive payments must be 
evaluated and defined over the same period.  
 
# 12- THE PRINCIPLE OF GROUP COMPENSATION 
If the impact of one’s effort cannot be separated from the efforts of other 
members of a group, then the incentive pay must be applied to the group as 
a whole, the sharing between the individuals being determined internally if 
the individuals can better assess from the inside the contribution of each 
member.   
 
 
4.  THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TWELVE PRINCIPLES 
 
The general and specific interpretation and implementation of the above principles in 
concrete, generic and particular cases is a difficult task which requires some thinking and 
planning. The thinking and planning relates respectively to what should be the proper 
interpretation of the principles in concrete cases and to what strategy should be defined to 
design the compensation formula and to gather the data necessary to its implementation   21 
throughout the organization. It is not the purpose of this paper to translate the theoretical 
principles into a cookbook of recipes each corresponding to a specific case. But it is clear 
that unless the principles are well understood, there is no hope to design appropriate 
compensating formulas. Let us recap the essential lessons of the above. 
 
The first principle, the principle of insurance, says that in general, incentive pay is not 
desirable.  If  there  is  no  major  problem  of  observation  or  information  regarding  the 
agent‟s effort or characteristics, a constant, given and fixed pay is better because it is less 
costly on average for the firm without reducing the well being of the worker or manager. 
Hence,  in  all  cases  where  the  principal  can  observe  reasonably  well  the  effort  and 
characteristics of the individual, she should determine the tasks to be done and offer a 
level of pay sufficient to attract the individual (or the necessary number of individuals) 
but independent of the performance of the firm or organization. This is the case for a 
large  majority  of  workers  and  managers.  But  there  are  cases  where  effort  and 
characteristics are difficult to assess. In those cases, an incentive pay system must be 
considered and designed and implemented if the costs of running such a system are not 
too high. If they are, the firm should move away from it even if this means a lower 
performance level.      
 
The second principle, the principle of rationality, says that any individual, worker or 
manager will choose his level of effort in raising the performance of the organization in 
reference to his own well being, whatever are the determinants of this well being. If effort 
is costly, one expects that the level of effort provided will be suboptimal if it cannot be 
determined directly (this requires perfect observation) by the firm or principal. When 
effort  is  costly, unobservable and hence chosen by the individual, it will be set  at  a 
relatively low level unless incentives are provided to favour a higher level. Of course, 
different  individuals  may  choose  different  levels  of  effort,  without  incentive  pay 
provisions, because they have different “utility functions”, that is, different values and 
different intrinsic motivations.     
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The third principle, the principle of certainty equivalence, says that there is always a 
fixed pay contract that the individual will consider equivalent to an incentive pay: the 
former means a lower pay on average for the individual, but more security or less risk in 
his compensation. Combined with the fifth principle, the principle of the risk premium, it 
sets up the basic incremental costs an incentive pay system  typically  represents. The 
compensation for the higher level of effort and for the risk the individual is facing under 
an incentive pay system must be properly calibrated to avoid both losing the individual if 
the participation constraint is not met and ending up with a lower than aimed for or 
desired effort level. As the fifth principle indicates, the risk premium to be paid to the 
individual increases with the individual‟s risk aversion and the intensity of incentives, 
and  decreases  with  the  quality  of  the  information  provided  by  the  indicator  variable 
directly related to the effort level (information of the first order) and by the indicator 
variable related to the blurring factors (information of the second order). It will therefore 
be important to invest in the quality of those information sources and their processing.        
 
The fourth principle, the principle of dual performance measures, stipulates that different 
sources of information must be properly calibrated and weighted in order to make an 
optimal use of each source. In the current model, we have two types of information, one 
providing imperfect indicators of the level of effort exerted by the individual, the other 
providing indicators on the level of uncertainty of the first type. Information of different 
types must be blended in a proper fashion as characterized by the fifth principle, not 
simply juxtaposed.     
 
The sixth principle, the principle of intensity of incentives, together with the seventh 
principle,  the  principle  of  optimized  performance,  say  that  an  organization  must 
determined the level of effort to be demanded, if necessary, from its members, workers or 
managers, and how much risk must be imposed on the individuals to achieve this level of 
(unobserved) effort. Intensity is positively related to desired effort: the larger the desired 
effort is, the higher the intensity of incentives should be, and therefore the costlier the 
incentive pay system will be.    
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The eighth principle, the principle of the efficient evaluation budget, says that a firm must 
be ready to invest in indicators definition and measure if it implements an incentive pay 
system, the more so the more difficult it is to improve the reliability of the evaluation 
process (to reduce its variance), the larger the representative level of risk aversion is in 
the organization, and the higher is the intensity of incentives. As mentioned before, an 
incentive  pay  system  is  costly,  both  in  terms  of  the  average  compensation  (to  take 
account of the risk premium) and in terms of the resources to spend on its administration 
and  efficiency.  One  crucial  objective  of  the  evaluation  budget  is  to  increase  the 
informativeness of the different types of indicators to be used to ascertain the effort level 
exerted. That is the object of the ninth principle, the principle of informativeness.  
  
The eleventh principle, the principle of deferred compensation, says that the incentive 
payments must be done at the time the information on performance is obtained. It is in 
line  with  the  methodology  of  the  economic  value  added  (EVA)  developed  by  Stern 
Stewart, a management consulting firm. EVA considers the cost of capital of the firm in 
the performance evaluation: economic profits (net of taxes and the cost of capital) rather 
than accounting profits must be used to ascertain performance. Moreover, EVA may be 
negative in some periods (for instance in the early years of an investment project) and 
positive in others. The timing of economic profits is as important as their level.    
 
Finally, the twelfth principle, the principle of group compensation, says that it might be 
better for the principal to provide incentive pay for a group rather than for an individual 
(the same principles will apply to the group) if there is more information within the group 
than  for  an  outside  observer,  that  is,  if  members  of  the  group  have  more  reliable 
information on each other contribution, while this information remains unverifiable for 
the outsiders. 
 
A striking example of this twelfth principle is the agricultural crisis of 1959-1961 in 
continental China. It is a particularly dramatic example of the consequences that can 
follow the failure to recognize the impacts of implicit (group) incentives contained in 
some reforms that change the economic environment of individuals.   24 
 
Agricultural collectivization in China began around 1952 and was immediately a clear 
success: the agricultural production increased in an impressive way between 1952 and 
1958. In contexts where information can be manipulated, production cooperatives can be 
extremely profitable if certain organizational requirements, mainly those that allow for 
the proper handling of coordination and motivation through adequate mechanisms, are 
met. It appears that the organizational structure of the Chinese agricultural cooperatives 
met these requirements in the first few years.  
 
In 1959, the production of grain decreased by 15% and did not recover in 1960. Then, in 
1961, grain production plummeted more than 30% below the levels reached in 1958. 
Why? Justin Yifu Lin (1990),
8 an economist of the University of Beijing  at that time, 
attributes most of  the fall in production to a modification of the organization of the 
cooperatives.  In  that  case,  the  modification  significantly  reduced  the  possibility  of 
effective coordination and efficient incentives for effort and resulted in a famine that 
caused an estimated 30 million deaths! What had happened? 
 
Following the success of the first cooperatives, the Chinese government decided in 1958-
1959 to extend the collectivization project to the whole agricultural production. The 
number of cooperatives had grown to  more than 735,000 in 1957 with 119,000,000 
households as members or an average of 160 households per cooperative. By the autumn 
of 1958, these cooperatives were gathered in 22,000 communities that covered almost the 
totality of the Chinese territory and ga thering an average of 5,000 households. Before 
1959, members of a cooperative had the option of withdrawing their labour or physical 
capital in order to join another cooperative project if they believed that the productivity or 
their share of the benefits was insufficient in the first cooperative.  
 
Various organizational changes were brought up in 1958-59. The right of withdrawal was 
abolished to simplify the administration of the system. The mode of remuneration was 
                                                 
8 J.Y. Lin (1990), “Collectivisation and China‟s agricultural crisis in 1959-61,” Journal of Political 
Economy 98, 1228-52. See also J.Y. Lin and D.T. Yang (2000), “Food Availability, Entitlements and the 
Chinese Famine of 1959-61,” The Economic Journal 110, 136-158.   25 
also changed from a redistribution of the benefits based on points of merit, to a system 
primarily based on the member‟s needs, independently of his productivity. The control 
and surveillance of the effort provided by each member was possible when there were 
160 households in the cooperative, thanks to the mutual observation of the comrades. 
However, when a cooperative reached 5,000 households, this task became impossible. 
Withdrawing the right of the individual to leave a cooperative and join another made the 
threat from more productive members totally void. 
 
Although there is no consensus on the specific effect of each one of these organizational 
changes,  one  could  predict  that  the  general  effect  of  these  changes  on  effort  and 
productivity levels would be disastrous, hence the famine. Intentions were most likely 
good, but replacing competence and rationality with incompetence and ideology ended up 
causing 30 million deaths! China had to wait for the de-collectivization of the eighties to 
recover the productivity levels recorded before 1959! 
 
There is nothing magical with incentive pay packages. If they are poorly designed, they 
are  likely  to  generate  more  harm  than  good:  garbage  in,  garbage  out.  The  National 
Commission on the causes of the financial and economic crisis in the United States writes 
in its January 2011 report:
9 “Compensation systems – designed in an environment of 
cheap money, intense competition, and light regulation – too often rewarded the quick 
deal,  the short-term  gain  –  without proper considerations  of long-term consequences. 
Often, those systems encouraged the big bet – where the payoff on the upside could be 
huge and the downside  limited.  This was  the case up and down the line  – from  the 
corporate boardroom to the mortgage broker on the street.” 
 
Not all examples of a misunderstanding of the impacts of reforms affecting incentives 
lead to such catastrophic situations and crises.  
 
                                                 
9 US Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, US Government Printing 
Office, Washington, January 2011, 662 pages (ISBN 978-0-16-087727-8).   26 
Jensen and Murphy in their very influential (2004) report
10 make 38 recommendations on 
remuneration schemes, broadly defined. They first embed the remuneration schemes into 
a broader corporate value  and control system: “Companies should embrace enlightened 
value maximization/enlightened stakeholder theory in which „creating firm value‟ is not 
one of many objectives, but the firm‟s sole or governing objective ... And this governing 
objective must be complemented by a statement of corporate vision and strategy that 
guides and motivates the organization in creating value. Properly understood enlightened 
value  creation  ...  insists  on  long-term  value  creation  as  the  firm‟s  governing 
objective.”(R-1)  
 
They  discuss  remuneration  schemes  at  a  considerably  more  detailed  level  but  their 
recommendations are all in line with the twelve principles discussed here. One of their 
most important groups of recommendations deals with the independence of the Board‟s 
remuneration  committee:  “Remuneration  committees  must  take  full  control  of  the 
remuneration process, policies, and practices”(R-10), “Firms should resolutely refuse as a 
matter of policy to pay the fees for the contracting agents negotiating for the CEO or 
other  top-managers”(R-11),  “Remuneration  committees  should  seldom,  if  ever,  use 
compensation consultants for executive remuneration purposes who are also used by the 
firm for actuarial or lower level employee remuneration assignments”(R-17).  
 
Jensen and Murphy insist on taking a global remuneration viewpoint: “Managers should 
receive annual statements that clearly summarize in one place the changes in their wealth 
in the prior year from all sources of remuneration from the firm (including changes in the 
present value of future retirement and deferred compensation)”(R-21). In the spirit of 
(15), they call for “Design bonus plans with „linear‟ pay-performance relations”(R-26). 
They write: “Better-designed pay-performance relations are linear over a broad range, 
with very high (or non-existent) caps, and “bonus banks” that allow bonuses to be 
negative as well as positive. Bonus banks can be created in a number of ways including, 
                                                 
10 Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy, Remuneration: Where we’ve been, how we got to here, what 
are the problems, and how to fix them, European Corporate Governance Institute and Harvard Business 
School, 2004.    27 
for example, paying a bonus out over three years, where the unpaid bonus is available to 
make up some or all of a negative bonus in the current year.”  
 
They insist also on keeping an eye on the risk borne by the worker or manager: “Use 
performance measures that reduce compensation risk while maintaining incentives”(R-
30)  since  that  risk  is  costly  for  the  firm  as  we  have  seen  above.  Regarding  group 
compensation,  they  argue  in  favour  of  relying  on  it  whenever  there  are  substantial 
interdependencies in productivity between the actions of two or more people or groups: “Pay 




Finally, Jensen and Murphy co nsider a broader principle than  our (ninth) principle of 
informativeness: “Managers should be held accountable for factors that are beyond their 
control  if  they  can  control  or  affect  the  impact  of  those  uncontrollable  factors  on 
performance”(R-35). 




5.  CONCLUSION 
We  began  this  inquiry  by  claiming  that  incentive  or  variable  pay  is  in  general  not 
desirable for two main reasons. First, it is costly. It creates remuneration variability or 
risk  for  workers  and  managers  who  are  typically  risk  averse.  Hence,  incentive  pay 
systems  will  be  more  expensive  for  firms  and  organizations  because  of  the  need  to 
compensate  people  to  convince  them  to  bear  such  risk.  Second,  an  incentive 
compensation system is costly to run both in gathering and processing information and in 
                                                 
11 Team work and the incentives problem that such arrangements raise and create have been the object of 
numerous contributions in economic theory. See among others Rasmussen, E., “Moral hazard in risk-averse 
teams,” Rand Journal of Economics 18 (3), 428-435; and McAfee, P.R. and J. McMillan, “Optimal 
Contracts for Teams,” International Economic Review 32 (3), 561-577.    28 
controlling the potential resentment effect when compensation falls below the mean level, 
a situation which will occur no less than half of the time. 
 
There are different reasons to revisit the topic of incentive pay at this time. There is 
strong  criticism  of  actual  systems  in  the  context  of  the  recent  financial  crisis  and 
economic recession, which allegedly stemmed in part from the structure of incentive pay 
systems in place in the financial sector.
12 Moreover, there are clear misunderstandings of 
the basic issues related to the role and nature of incentive pay in general.   
 
The  bird‟s  eye  view  taken  here  is  quite  abstract  and  general.  Because  of  that,  the 
principles  are  relevant  and  can  be  applied  to  most  if  not  all  cases  of  incentive  pay 
systems. The twelve principles are more a (difficult) path to an efficient incentive pay 
system  than  a  recipe  to  apply  without  scrutiny.  Too  much  of  the  latter  clogs  the 
compensation schemes in private sector and public sector firms and organizations. The 
twelve principles could be used by a Board as a guide to understand how the incentive 
pay system of its firm has been designed and how the different components have been 
evaluated and (stress) tested. Indeed, as the popular maxims go: “unless you know what 
you are looking for, there is little hope to find it” and “if you don‟t know where you are 
going, you will probably end up somewhere else.”   
No doubt the application of the twelve principles as a road map in setting up an incentive 
pay system will raise many challenges. But at least, they show the way to go and the 
questions  to  ask.  The  evaluation  of  the  parameters,  variances  and  covariances  pose 
                                                 
12 The popular press is filled with stories of inadequate incentive pay systems, echoing earlier works such 
as Jensen and Murphy, op.cit. According the US Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC), op.cit.: 
“Compensation structures were skewed all along the mortgage securitization chain, from people who 
originated mortgages to people on Wall Street who packaged them into securities. Regarding mortgage 
brokers, often the first link in the process, FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair told the FCIC that their „standard 
compensation practice . . . was based on the volume of loans originated rather than the performance and 
quality of the loans made.‟ She concluded, „The crisis has shown that most financial institution 
compensation systems were not properly linked to risk management. Formula-driven compensation allows 
high short-term profits to be translated into generous bonus payments, without regard to any longer-term 
risks.‟ SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro told the FCIC, „Many major financial institutions created asymmetric 
compensation packages that paid employees enormous sums for short-term success, even if these same 
decisions result in significant long-term losses or failure for investors and taxpayers.‟” 
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significant problems. But those challenges can be met and the implementation of the 
twelve principles adapted to specific cases through different methodologies depending on 
the data which exist or can be mined. Confronting the challenges and costs of an efficient 
incentive pay system, the firm or organization must evaluate if those challenges and costs 
can  be  borne  in  order  to  capture  larger  gains  in  productivity,  profitability  or  more 
generally benefits.
13  
                                                 
13 E.P. Lazear (“Performance Pay and Productivity”, NBER WP 5672, July 1996) have shown in a detailed 
case study that switching from hourly wages to piece rates allowed a large autoglass company to raise 
average productivity and to attract a more able work force. In fact, gains in productivity were “extremely 
large, amounting to anywhere from about 20% to 36% of output ... About half of the worker-specific 
increase in productivity is passed on to workers in the form of higher wages.” 